Our study investigates rivalry between multinational enterprises (MNEs) in host country markets. Drawing on the awareness-motivation-capability perspective, we show how the speed of an MNE's response to a rival's attack is influenced by resourcerelated factors, including distance, government constraints, and subsidiary control, and by market-related factors, including initiating country importance, location of the response in the initiating country, and multimarket contact. We provide a new conceptualization and empirical approach for studying rivalry between MNEs. Additionally, our theory and evidence imply that important constraints on MNE actions in host country markets go well beyond the constraints faced in domestic competition.
In August, 1998, Renault launched a new version of the Twingo-its best selling mini-in all the major European markets. To fend off the tough competition from the Fiat Seicento . . . Renault surprised the market by cutting the price of Twingo by 15 percent.
- Farhi, 1998 In April, 2001, Nissan Motor Co. introduced a redesigned Altima, with the most powerful engines of its product category in the US, to go head to head with the Toyota Camry.
- Rechtin, 2001 As multinational enterprises (MNEs) strive for global competitive advantage, they must constantly respond to their rivals to defend or improve their market positions. When challenged by Renault, how and where will Fiat respond? Similarly, how and where will Toyota counter the threat of new model introduction by Nissan? The answers to these questions are important, because how a firm acts and reacts with regard to rivals is a vital determinant of its performance (Porter, 1980) . Recognizing the importance of examining competitive actions and responses, prior competitive dynamics research has identified a number of antecedents of interfirm rivalry. For example, firms tend to respond faster to actions that are irreversible, to actions taken in strategically important markets, and to actions from rivals with resource endowments and market profiles that are similar to their own (Chen, 1996; Chen & MacMillan, 1992) .
Although important insights have been gained, the theoretical development and empirical testing of competitive dynamics research have largely been restricted to domestic (i.e., single-country) settings. Undoubtedly, many drivers of rivalry in domestic settings also apply to international settings; however, the international context contains factors that have no ready counterpart in home-country settings (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999) . As a result, some assumptions, such as relatively homogeneous markets and competitors, consistent and uniform government regulations, and tight control over organizations by their top managers, are called into question when one examines rivalry between MNEs in host country markets.
To begin filling this gap, we study factors that affect the response speed of MNEs in host countries. Drawing on the awareness-motivation-capability perspective, we show how the speed of an MNE's response to a rival's attack is influenced by resource-related factors, such as distance, government constraints, and subsidiary control, and by market-related factors, such as initiating country importance, response occurrence in the country of attack (within-country response), and multimarket contact. We model the rivalry of MNE dyads as an unfolding and continuous sequence of actions between the two firms in all the country markets where both compete. A response, in our study, is defined as any action taken by an MNE against a given rival that temporally follows an earlier action by that rival (Ferrier, 2001) . The response could occur in the country in which the attack occurred (the initiating country) or in some other country where both rivals compete. Response speed derives from the time between a rival's initiating action and the firm's response. We could refer to our dependent variable as "time between actions" because we cannot be certain that any given action that we observe is, in fact, a clear-cut "response" to an earlier action. We decided to retain the "response speed" label because, as we describe later, theory predicts that any action, regardless of how long it has been planned, is likely to be importantly influenced by the most recent action taken by a competitor.
Using a number of factors not considered in prior research, our study of relatively microcompetitive actions complements the international business literature, which has emphasized more macro competitive actions such as market entry and foreign direct investment (Delios & Henisz, 2000; Graham, 1990; Knickerbocker, 1973) . Moreover, our study empirically tests the promising awareness-motivation-capability perspective with a data set of competitive actions and responses undertaken by 13 global automakers over seven years. In so doing, we extend competitive dynamics research into the global arena. Finally, our study introduces a new analytical methodology to competitive dynamics research, modeling dyad-level competitive interaction as a series of event histories. The event history approach resolves several important problems with modeling response speed and permits us to simultaneously model response behavior over a range of host countries.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Our study builds on competitive dynamics research, which emphasizes the active, energetic, and purposeful process by which firms interact. Competitive dynamics research has recently made two important advances. The first is the development of the awareness-motivation-capability framework, which is the theoretical anchor of our study (Chen, 1996) . The second is a process-based approach to examining competitive interaction (e.g., Ferrier, 2001 ). The process-based approach highlights that modeling response speed in a sequence of actions and responses is critical to revealing the pattern of competitive interaction. In the remainder of this section, we discuss the theoretical foundations and key components of the awareness-motivationcapability framework and then define and explain the concept of response speed.
The Awareness-Motivation-Capability Framework
Drawing on diverse streams of research on organizational change, learning, and decision making (Allison, 1971; Dutton & Jackson, 1987; Kiesler & Sproull, 1982; Lant, Milliken, & Batra, 1992; Schelling, 1960) , competitive dynamics scholars have suggested three drivers of interfirm rivalry: awareness, motivation, and capability (Chen, 1996; Smith, Ferrier, & Ndofor, 2001 ). According to the awareness-motivation-capability framework, competitors will respond to an action only if they are aware of it and have the motivation and capability to respond. The awareness-motivation-capability framework is grounded in existing theories. For example, considering actions and responses from an organizational communication perspective highlights that the decision-making process behind competitive actions is an information-seeking and information-processing activity (Huber & Daft, 1987; Smith, Grimm, & Gannon, 1992) . The level of awareness is important because it affects the extent to which a firm comprehends the consequences of its actions and its rivals' actions within the competitive landscape (Chen, 1996) .
A firm can be aware of its rivals and the competitive environment without being motivated to respond. Expectancy-valence theory provides the microlevel underpinnings for the motivation and capability dimensions of the awareness-motivation-capability framework. Vroom (1964) argued that two basic conditions underlie the proclivity to act: the subjective reward value (valence) of acting effectively, and the expectation or perceived probability of earning a reward (expectancy). Thus, the motivation to respond will be greatest when the potential responder feels that something important is at stake (Atkinson, 1964) .
Finally, even if an attack puts much at stake, the responder still must have the capability to respond (Vroom, 1964) . The resource-based view of the firm highlights the importance of heterogeneous resources and capabilities in defending and sustaining competitive advantage (Barney, 1986; Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Peteraf, 1993) . Thus, if the resources and capabilities for responding are not available, a firm may delay its response or not respond at all.
The awareness-motivation-capability framework has been increasingly adopted by strategy research (e.g., Chen & Su, in press; Ferrier, 2001; Ferrier, Smith, & Grimm, 1999) . Our study extends this framework into a global context. Our extended awareness-motivation-capability framework implies that competitors will respond to a rival's action to the extent that they are (1) aware of the action and of the country where the action took place, (2) motivated to respond to the action and to defend or expand their global presence, and (3) capable of deploying resources for responding in host countries.
Response Speed
Porter noted that "finding strategic moves that will benefit from a delay in retaliation, or making moves so as to maximize the delay, are key principles of competitive interaction " (1980: 98) . Theoretically, examining response speed is important, because it has vital implications for firm performance and competitive advantage. Researchers have shown that slow-responding rivals often experience market share losses or missed profit opportunities (Ferrier et al., 1999) .
Following the lead of Ferrier (2001) , our study takes a process-based approach to modeling rivalry between MNEs. In this approach, a response is defined as any action by an MNE against a given rival that follows an earlier (initiating) action by that rival. The response could occur in the country where the initiating action occurred or in any other country or countries where both dyad partners compete. Accordingly, response speed derives from the time in days between a rival's initiating action and an MNE's observed response. Note that each action taken by an MNE against a rival creates a set of response opportunities-one for each country where both firms compete. In our conceptualization, an action taken by firm A against rival firm B is the starting point for modeling firm B's response. Firm B's response, which could occur in any combination or permutation of countries where both compete, is both the response to firm A's initiating action and the action that initiates the start of a new set of response opportunities (i.e., for firm A). Each action is therefore a response (ending one set of response opportunities) and an initiating action (starting a set of response opportunities). Like Ferrier's (2001) concepts, our concepts of response and response speed emphasize accuracy in identifying the timing and target of action, yet we do not strongly assert that a given action is a clearcut and direct "response" to the earlier action by a rival, though it does follow that action sequentially.
We believe our notion of response effectively captures the spirit of the competitive interaction process. Schumpeter (1947) described interfirm rivalry as a race among competitors to get ahead and stay ahead of one another. In this race, we believe, any action launched against a given rival can (and likely does) include elements of response to the rival's most recent action, elements of response to earlier actions by that rival, elements of independent initiative, and even elements of response to anticipated actions by that rival. Furthermore, our notion of response fits the global auto industry, where high capital intensity and long planning horizons make the link between actions and responses somewhat tenuous (Smith, Ferrier, & Ndofor, 2001 ).
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Our study describes several factors that are important to rivalry between MNEs, but not considered in previous research, primarily because past research has been limited to single-country settings. To select the factors, we evaluated the central concepts from research on MNEs and used the awareness-motivation-capability framework to identify those with the most promise as antecedents of response speed. To be included, a concept had to impact one or more dimensions of the framework. We organized our factors into resourcerelated and market-related categories. In the resource-related category, we identified distance, government constraints, and subsidiary control. Each of these directly affects the resources needed for an effective response. In the market-related category, we identified initiating country importance, response occurrence in the country of attack (within-country response), and multimarket contact. Each of these directly relates to the market dependence and market presence of MNEs.
Before we explain in detail how each factor affects response speed, it is important to clarify several terms. We study MNE dyads or pairs of rival firms. In our study, the initiator is the MNE that took an initial action, and the responder is the MNE that is expected to respond. Home country refers to an MNE's nation of origin-whether it is initiator or responder. Host country refers to any country where an MNE competes except its home country. Initiating country refers to a country where a rival's attack takes place.
Resource-Related Factors
Much research bolsters the notion that strategies are constrained by, and dependent on, both the resources available to a firm and factors related to the effective deployment of resources (Barney, 1991) . The global context in which MNEs operate features a number of factors that directly affect re-source availability and/or resource deployment but are of much less (or no) importance in domestic contexts. We chose three factors from the literature on MNEs-distance, government constraints, and subsidiary control-that are germane to global settings and have significant impacts on resources needed by MNEs in responding to rivals. Further, each of these directly affects one or more of the three dimensions of the awareness-motivationcapability framework.
Distance
Ghemawat argued that even in the age of the Internet and global communications networks, "distance still matters " (2001: 137) . Focusing on geographic distance, we contend that geographic distance impedes an MNE's capacity to transfer resources and absorb knowledge across countries. As a result, the geographic distance between an MNE's home and a given host country, and between an MNE's home and an initiating country, will hamper the MNE's response speed.
Home-host country distance. Geographic distance between an MNE's home and a given host country will constrain the MNE's capability to act in that country and thereby slow its response. Geographic distance adds the cost and difficulty of internal coordination, increasing the resources required for responding. As a result, it becomes difficult for subsidiary managers to transfer their knowledge of a local market back to headquarters and make swift competitive decisions (Ghemawat, 2001) . Moreover, although subsidiaries contribute significantly to the overall development of an MNE, they depend on headquarters for critical resources such as capital, innovation capacity, and managerial expertise (Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1990; Veugelers, 1995) . The resources and capabilities of MNE headquarters are probably less helpful to geographically distant subsidiaries. Furthermore, distance makes the activity sharing and synergy formation between headquarters and subsidiaries less efficient (Golden & Ma, 2003; Porter, 1987) . For example, Davidson and McFetridge (1985) found that MNEs were more likely to transfer technology to a foreign subsidiary when the home and receiving countries were geographically closer. Therefore: Anecdotal evidence supports the argument behind Hypothesis 1. For example, in 1994, in response to a new four-cylinder engine developed by Honda, General Motors planned to introduce its own global four-cylinder engine, called the L850, in the United States and Europe. However, it took GM five years to eventually produce the L850 in Europe. The engineering director of GM North America, Otto Willenbockel, noted, "We know how to design engines, but we don't know how to design an engine that is suitable for the other group . . . this may be one reason it was not a very quick project. . . . Essentially, Europeans want the maximum speed and best cruising feel, while we want the best launch torque with the best possible fuel economy" (Robinson, 1999: 5) .
Home-initiating country distance. Hypothesis 1 centers on the geographic distance between an MNE's home country and a host country where a response may occur. In Hypothesis 2, we focus on the geographic distance between an MNE's home country and the initiating country where a rival's attack has taken place. We argue that when an attack occurs in a geographically distant country, the MNE's awareness of the action as well as its motivation to respond swiftly are hampered. Large geographic distance hinders the collection and interpretation of information about an attack (Ghemawat, 2001; Ghoshal & Kim, 1986) and makes it more difficult for headquarters managers to recognize the attack, understand the intentions behind it, and develop effective response strategies. Furthermore, in research on international business, the strategic importance of their home countries for MNEs has long been recognized (Casson, 1987; Graham, 1990) . This logic suggests that when a rival attacks an MNE in a country that is "close to home," the MNE will be more threatened and more motivated to respond quickly. Therefore: 
Government Constraints
Governments can affect the strategic actions and survival prospects of foreign-based MNEs by creating barriers to their access to critical resources and increasing their cost of doing business (Delios & Beamish, 1999; Loree & Guisinger, 1995; North, 1990; Rugman & Verbeke, 1990) . We define government constraints as rules and regulations that hinder MNEs' entry and daily operations. As important players in international markets, govern-ments can constrain the resources and actions of foreign-based MNEs operating in their domestic markets (North, 1990) and enhance the resources and actions of home-based MNEs when they compete abroad.
Host government constraints. We propose that host government constraints hinder the motivation and capability of an MNE to respond to rivals' attacks. First, government constraints, such as laws and regulations on importing and exporting of goods, attainment of government licenses, taxes, and availability of loans, directly affect an MNE's capability to respond swiftly (Davidson, 1980; Henisz & Delios, 2001; Loree & Guisinger, 1995) . Consider the Japanese automakers' attempt to enter Europe as an example. In 1999, the top three Japanese makers, Honda, Nissan, and Toyota, in response to European brands' successful entry into Asia, were all eager to gain market share in Europe. However, for almost a year their performance was disappointing. Akira Imai, president of Toyota Motor Europe, complained, "Our imports were hit badly by the 10 percent duty; this is much higher than the 8 percent in Korea or the 2.5 percent in the USA . . . we believe it is . . . very unfair. . . . We know we can't raise market share quickly and dramatically without the danger of a trade war" (Kurylko & Catterall, 2000: 3) . Second, host government constraints correspond with political hazards (that is, unpredictable political institutions). Such hazards increase uncertainty for both headquarters and subsidiary managers when they try to foresee future investment conditions (Henisz & Delios, 2001; North, 1990) Home government constraints. Building on the awareness-motivation-capability framework, we develop the notion that a "safe backyard," well protected by an MNE's home government, increases the MNE's motivation and capability to respond in host countries. First, according to multimarket competition research, firms tend to refrain from competing aggressively in each others' home countries because they recognize and respect each others' "spheres of influence" (Brander & Krugman, 1983; Casson, 1987; Graham, 1990; Veugelers, 1995) . However, home government constraints change the perceived payoff associated with response. A safe backyard reduces uncertainty caused by the fear of rivals' revenge at home. As a result, an MNE will be more motivated to respond in host countries to rivals' attacks. Second, government constraints in an MNE's home country also enable it to leverage the advantages it obtains at home and increase the capability of its subsidiaries to compete overseas. Krugman (1984) and Venables (1984) showed that home government protection lowers domestic firms' average and marginal costs, helping them "move down the learning curve" more quickly than rivals and increasing their capability to respond. Some authors have argued that firms in protected countries tend to lack the skills or motivation to engage in rivalrous behavior abroad (Marcus, 1990; Rugman & Verbeke, 1990) . Although this argument may hold under certain circumstances, in industries characterized by high levels of globalization and strategic interdependence (such as auto manufacturing), we believe this effect is of much less concern (Veugelers, 1995). Therefore:
Hypothesis 4. The speed of an MNE's response in a host country to an action taken by a rival in any country is positively associated with the level of government constraints in the MNE's home country.
We note that governments can also use aggressive policy instruments such as export subsidies and diplomatic negotiations to improve the competitive environment for home-based MNEs. However, our study is limited to defensive policies such as constraints on foreign MNEs' daily operations. Further, it has been argued that government protection hurts consumer welfare and results in economic distortions (Marcus, 1990) and that different government protections have different impacts on foreign direct investment (Ellingsen & Wärneryd, 1999) . However, these issues are beyond the scope of our study.
Subsidiary Control
Subsidiary control refers to the strength of the link between an MNE's headquarters and its subsidiary in a given host country (we assume that headquarters control is uniformly strong in the home country). Conceptually, subsidiary control captures the efficiency and effectiveness of information flows between headquarters and subsidiaries as well as the extent to which MNE headquarters can dictate the operating and strategic decisions of its foreign-based subsidiaries (Golden & Ma, 2003) . We propose that strong subsidiary control increases an MNE's motivation and capability to respond in a given host country.
Greater control over a subsidiary gives an MNE headquarters more leverage to affect the subsidiary's competitive strategy. The subsidiary will also be more motivated to consider the integrated global market and respond quickly to a competitor's challenges in light of the gains to the entire MNE. For example, in August 2001, Ford substantially increased its control over its British subsidiaries. As the president of the Premier Automotive Group, Mike O'Driscoll, put it, "The driving force behind this is the marketplace. . . . By centralizing control, the new organizations will intensify their efforts to fight with their rivals in the market place" (Brown & Henry, 2001: 3) . Moreover, as we mentioned earlier, to respond to rivals' attacks, subsidiaries depend on headquarters for some critical resources. Increased subsidiary control leads to administrative mechanisms that facilitate the flow of knowledge, information, and resources between headquarters and subsidiaries (Doz & Prahalad, 1981) . This flow of knowledge, information, and resources increases headquarters' awareness of rivals' attacks as well as subsidiaries' capability to respond. For example, in October 1998, GM increased its control over many overseas subsidiaries. GM hoped the new arrangements would cut red tape and speed GM vehicles to markets around the world. "This [new arrangement] allows us to better control the global operations and respond quickly to rivals' actions, while at the same time leveraging the experience, talent and diversity of our people worldwide," said Rick Wagoner, president of GM Automotive Operations (Kurylko, 1998: 3) . Therefore:
Hypothesis 5. The speed of an MNE's response in a host country to an action taken by a rival in any country is positively associated with the MNE's degree of control over its subsidiary in the host country.
We note that conflicting views exist in the international business literature regarding the implications of headquarters control for subsidiaries' international activities. Some have argued that high levels of global integration restrict the autonomy of subsidiaries and reduce their flexibility and responsiveness (Baliga & Jaeger, 1984; Gates & Egelhoff, 1986 ). Although such reduction may have a chilling effect on a subsidiary's response speed, we believe that an effective MNE competitive strategy should involve coordinated actions and reactions across subsidiaries enforced by sufficient corporate control (Prahalad & Doz, 1987; Yip, 1995) .
Market-Related Factors
Porter (1980) noted that market conditions strongly influence the intensity of rivalry. Similarly, previous studies have also shown that the market environment shapes competitive strategies (Miller & Friesen, 1984) . In line with these arguments, we expect that the response speed of an MNE is affected by three market-related factorsinitiating country importance, response occurrence in the country of attack (within-country response), and multimarket contact.
Initiating country importance. Previous research suggests that the degree of threat an action poses to a potential responder is a strong predictor of response speed. For instance, Chen and MacMillan (1992) found that the greater a firm's dependence on the markets affected by an attacker's action, the quicker the response. Similarly, Tsai, MacMillan, and Low (1991) showed that competitors who are highly dependent on a given market respond aggressively to the threat of a new entrant into that market. In keeping with these arguments, in Hypothesis 6 we propose that the strategic importance of an initiating country increases an MNE's awareness of an attack and enhances its motivation to respond quickly. First, an MNE is more likely to be aware of an action taken in its important markets because such actions will generally be considered more threatening. Although the MNE may initially be uncertain of the implications of an attack, the importance of the market will motivate a quick response. Second, in deciding how to respond to a rival's attack, a firm must balance the payoff for responding late against the payoff for responding swiftly. In this decision-making process, the share to be gained or lost by the firm is an important determinant of the firm's payoff. Since firms generally are very sensitive to the revenues and profits derived from key markets, the more attackers' moves occur in their key markets, the greater the response payoffs involved, and the more motivated the firms will be to launch speedy responses. Therefore:
Hypothesis 6. The speed of an MNE's response in a host country to an action taken by a rival in any country is positively associated with the strategic importance of the initiating country (i.e., the country where the action was taken) to the MNE.
Within-country response. There are several reasons to believe that the speed of an MNE's response to an attack will be faster in the initiating country (the country where the action occurred). All of the reasons are linked to motivation. First, although some research predicts cross-country responses among multimarket competitors (e.g., Gimeno, 1999) , and some initiating actions might well provoke responses in countries other than the initiat-ing country, the application of the awarenessmotivation-capability framework suggests that an MNE's motivation to respond will be very strong in the initiating country, because this is where the signaling value of responding will be maximized (Axelrod, 1984; Clark & Montgomery, 1998) . Research has shown that a firm's reputation for being capable and willing to defend its markets lowers the expected value of attack for rival firms (Clark & Montgomery, 1998; Kreps & Wilson, 1982; Milgrom & Roberts, 1982) . Thus, it is strategically important for a firm to respond in the country where it has been challenged. Furthermore, both theory (e.g., Porter, 1980) and evidence (e.g., Ferrier & Lee, 2002; Ferrier et al., 1999) suggest that not responding in an initiating market will lead to market share erosion in that market. Although the cited studies were focused on single-country settings, their conclusions seem applicable to the global setting as well. Therefore:
Hypothesis 7. The speed of an MNE's response in a host country to an action taken by a rival in any country is increased when the host country is where the initiating action took place.
Multimarket contact. Multimarket contact occurs when firms encounter the same rivals in multiple markets.
1 Research in IO (industrial organization) economics, organization theory, and strategic management implies that the behavior of firms in any single market is affected by the extent to which they meet the same competitors in other markets (Baum & Korn, 1999; Bulow, Geanakoplos, & Klemperer, 1985; Evans & Kessides, 1994; Gimeno, 1999) . Multimarket contact gives a firm the option to respond to actions by a rival not only in the market being challenged, but also in other markets where they both compete. As a result, multimarket competitors may hesitate to attack in one market for fear of retaliation in other markets (Edwards, 1955) .
However, how will a firm respond when a multimarket competitor challenges it? Drawing on the awareness-motivation-capability framework, we believe that the level of multimarket contact an MNE has with a given rival will increase its awareness of the rival's attack and enhance its motivation and capability to respond swiftly. First, in an oligopolistic setting like the auto industry, multimarket contact facilitates mutual awareness because firms become familiar with each others' intentions and capabilities. Thus, more multimarket contact with a rival implies a greater likelihood that an initiating action from that rival will be noticed. Second, multimarket contact captures the extent to which two firms are in direct competition. The interdependence between rivals increases the "valence" of responding to each others' attacks. Young and colleagues (Young, Smith, Grimm, & Simon, 2000) argued that as a firm's multimarket contact with a rival increases, its assets become increasingly threatened by that rival. As a result, the firm's motivation to deter the rival from competitive behavior also increases. Moreover, a quick response signals a strong commitment to defending a market position (Axelrod, 1984; Clark & Montgomery, 1998) . If a rival feels its attack will engender a quick response and the competitive advantage from the attack will be short-lived (Camerer, 1991; Weigelt & Camerer, 1988) , it is less likely to attack in the first place (Young et al., 2000) . Finally, Chen (1996) argued that if a competitive response to a challenge requires major organizational restructuring, the response will be slowed. Since multimarket rivals are likely to have similar strategic competencies, we expect that more multimarket contact will be associated with more capability to respond. Therefore:
Hypothesis 8. The speed of an MNE's response in a host country to an action taken by a rival in any country is positively associated with the degree of multimarket contact between the MNE and its rival.

METHODOLOGY Data Description
To test our hypotheses, we examined the competitive interactions of global automobile manufacturers from 1995 to 2001. The global automobile industry was a good setting for our study for several reasons. First, the industry is known for intense rivalry among an identifiable and manageable set of firms (Martin, Swaminathan, & Mitchell, 1998; Thomas & Weigelt, 2000) . In this oligopolistic setting, the degree of strategic interdependence among the major players is high. As a result, the actions undertaken by one firm are likely to have significant impacts on other competitors and, accordingly, the outcomes of actions hinge on the responses. Second, distinct (national) markets can be readily identified, along with the competitors in each market (country). Additionally, country-market characteristics around the globe are relatively heterogeneous. Third, information about the indus-try and each of the countries involved is widely available. Finally, for firms in the industry, automobile manufacture is the major line of business, so the potential for confounding influence from diversification is minimal.
We identified the 13 largest firms in the industry from the 1995-2001 volumes of Ward's Automotive Yearbook. The firms were DaimlerChrysler, Fiat, Ford, General Motors, Honda, Hyundai, Mitsubishi, Nissan, PSA Peugeot Citroen, Renault, Suzuki, Toyota, and Volkswagen.
2 Between 1995 and 2001, our sample firms accounted for between 76 and 88 percent of world motor vehicle production. The 27 countries in our sample together represented approximately 99 percent of world motor vehicle sales during the study period. Survivor bias among subsidiaries was of minimal concern in our study. During our study window, we observed only three cases in which a sample firm withdrew from a host country.
Identification of Competitive Actions
Data on competitive actions were gathered from Automotive News. Established in 1925 and delivered weekly to more than 80,000 subscribers in 70 countries, Automotive News offers complete and detailed reports on global automakers' announcements and actions. We used structured content analysis to identify competitive actions (Jauch, Osborn, & Martin, 1980; Miller & Friesen, 1977) . First, one author read all the articles published by Automotive News in 1995 and generated a list of keywords (e.g., "rivalry," "competition," "war") that were likely to indicate competitive events (a full list of key words is available from the first author upon request). We then searched all Automotive News articles between 1995 and 2001 to identify those that mentioned one or more of our sample firms and included at least one keyword in our list. This step yielded 6,648 news articles. We then carefully read each article and identified 2,207 dyad-level competitive actions. Each action was classified into one of six action types: capacity action, major product action, pricing action, marketing action, distribution and service improvement, and minor product action. If one action involved multiple categories, we coded it as a single action but with multiple action types. For instance, GM invested $100 million in China to build two new plants and introduce a new model. We coded this action as one action with two action types: capacity action and major product action. Finally, we screened the data to remove duplicate reports of competitive actions. Appendix A provides more detail on the distribution of actions over companies, countries, and years. Table 1 gives details on the six action categories we identified.
When Automotive News reported an action, it typically specified the country or countries where the action was undertaken. When an action involved several countries, we noted each. When only a multicountry region was mentioned, we assumed the action occurred in all the important countries of that region. For example, when a new model was introduced in Western Europe, we counted the action as occurring in each of the five key auto markets in Western Europe-the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, and Spain. When no information was provided regarding the location of an action (a very rare event), we used the geographic classification of the news article to identify the country or countries where it applied. Most of our actions (77%) involved only one country, and 97 percent involved fewer than six countries.
To check the overall accuracy and comprehensiveness of Automotive News as a data source for competitive actions, we drew 30 competitive actions at random and searched for references to them in other major business publications. We found 26 of the 30 actions (87%) in other publications and confirmed the details reported by Automotive News in every case.
Dependent Variable: Response Speed
As we discussed earlier, we used the number of days between a rival firm's action against a focal firm and the subsequent response action of the focal firm against the same rival to measure response speed. The response could occur in the country in which the initiating action occurred (the initiating country) or in any other host country where the dyad partners both competed.
Independent Variables
Distance. Geographic distance was measured as the logarithm of the number of kilometers between the capital cities of an MNE's home country and the country of interest. We measured both home-host country distance, and home-initiating country distance. We also gauged cultural distance, using four dimensions of the Hofstede index (Hofstede, 1980) . In analyses available from the first author upon request, we reached the same conclusions with cultural distance as we report for geographic distance. However, given the concerns raised about the Hofstede index (e.g., McSweeney, 2002), we report only geographic distance results here.
Government constraints. The degrees of home and host government constraints were assessed with the Executive Opinion Survey conducted each year by the World Economic Forum. This survey collects information on the perceptions of 4,000 top executives about the competitive characteristics of 59 countries. Three variables from the survey were selected. Average responses to the statements, "Administrative procedures are not an important obstacle to starting a new business," "Government regulations do not impose a heavy burden on business competitiveness," and "Irregular payments connected with import and export permits, business licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments, police protection or loan applications are not common" were reverse-coded to reflect MNE managers' perceptions of restrictions on their business. We then factor-analyzed the three variables and created a composite measure (␣ ϭ .85). Note that we used the same measure (albeit for different countries) to gauge host government constraints and home government constraints.
Subsidiary control. An MNE can enter a foreign market in a number of ways: via a wholly owned subsidiary, joint venture, strategic alliance, technology license, manufacturing collaboration, or other form. These forms of entry are quite heterogeneous in terms of the degree of control corporate headquarters can exert over subsidiaries in host markets (Harrigan, 1985) . According to Gatignon and Anderson, "Higher operational control results from having a greater ownership in a foreign venture" (1988: 3). As a proxy for subsidiary control, corporate ownership has been found to influence the types of reports and mandates exchanged between MNE headquarters and subsidiaries (Egelhoff, 1988) as well as the motivation of subsidiary managers in their dealings with headquarters and other subsidiaries (Martinez & Jarillo, 1989) . To capture subsidiary control, we used the percentage of a subsidiary's equity held by its MNE headquarters (Curhan, Davidson, & Suri, 1977; Delios & Henisz, 2000) . Who Owns Whom: The Directory of Corporate Affiliation was our source for equity ownership data.
Initiating country importance and within-country response. We gauged initiating country importance as the proportion of a responding MNE's sales that occurred in the initiating country. To capture whether or not a response was a withincountry response, we included a dummy variable, within-country response, indicating whether or not the focal host country was also the initiating country. Multimarket contact. To capture the degree of multimarket contact between rivals, we chose the dyadic measure developed by Baum and Korn (1999) . This measure takes into account the strategic significance (centrality) of each country the two firms compete in (the proportion of each firm's total sales represented by each country). It is important to consider the sales centrality of the markets where two competitors meet because, as Baum and Korn pointed out, "A smaller number of contacts in high-centrality markets . . . can yield higher multimarket contact than a larger number of contacts in low-centrality markets" (1996: 262).
We used the measure below to capture the level of multimarket contact between two firms, i and j,
where m denotes a given market in the set of markets M it or M jt served by either or both firms i and j at time t. C imt and C jmt are the centralities (strategic importance) of market m to firms i and j at time t.
As noted earlier, in including strategic importance-centrality-we recognized that multimarket contact increases when two firms meet in important markets, relative to the contact between similar dyads that meet in smaller and less important markets. D imt and D jmt are indicator variables set equal to 1 if firms i and j are active in market m at time t and 0 otherwise.
Control Variables
As noted earlier, prior research has established that competitive rivalry can be importantly influenced by the characteristics of (1) the host country, (2) the initiating country, (3) the responder, (4) the initiating action, and (5) the initiator (Smith, Grimm, & Gannon, 1992) . To ensure a fully specified model, we included measures of these characteristics as controls.
To control for host country characteristics, we included host GDP growth, measured as the annual percentage growth rate of a country's gross domestic product (GDP), as reported in the World Development Indicator database. Studies suggest that firms compete less aggressively in high-growth countries (Porter, 1980) . We also controlled for host market concentration, measured as the percentage of a country's total sales represented by the four largest competitors in that country. As a final characteristic of the initiating country, we included a dummy variable, initiator's home, coded 1 if the initiating country was also the initiator's home country and 0 otherwise.
To control for the characteristics of a responder, we included responder size, measured as the log of the firm's world production (number of vehicles) in a given year. Research has shown that firms of varying sizes may possess different levels of resources and have different propensities for taking action. We also controlled for responder international experience, because firms with more international experience can better deal with the liability of foreignness and respond more quickly (Anand & Khanna, 2000; Delios & Beamish, 2001; Erramilli, 1991; Li, 1995) . We measured a firm's international experience using the transnationality index developed by United Nation's World Investment Report, which is the average of three ratios: foreign sales to total sales, foreign assets to total assets, and foreign employment to total employment.
We included several measures to control for the characteristics of an initiating action. Prior studies have found that competitors are more motivated and better able to respond quickly to tactical actions than to strategic ones because strategic actions generally involve larger commitments of resources and planning (Chen & MacMillan, 1992; Smith, Grimm, Gannon, & Chen, 1991) . We split our six action types into two groups: major moves (capacity actions and major product actions) and minor moves (pricing actions, marketing actions, distribution and service improvements, and minor product actions) and we created a dummy variable, major initiating move, coded 1 for a major move and 0 otherwise. Similarly, we controlled for the magnitude of an initiating move using the total number of countries involved in an initiator's attack with the variable number of initiating countries. Finally, we controlled for the complexity of the initial move, since firms tend to respond more slowly to more complex actions. As noted earlier, some actions involved more than one action category. Complexity of initiating move was the total number of action categories involved in an initiator's action.
To control for the characteristics of an initiating firm, we included a variable for the geographic distance between the focal firm and the initiating firm, dyad partner distance. Competitors that are closer geographically will find it easier to understand each other's strategic intentions, and they are likely to be perceived similarly by customers as well. As a result, actions initiated by a geographically close rival will generally be perceived as a greater threat.
Analytical Methodology
Prior studies in competitive dynamics have modeled both response likelihood and response speed (Chen, Smith, & Grimm, 1992) . The analytical methodologies of prior research raised some significant concerns in our context. For example, when modeling the time between an action and a response, a researcher might be inclined to use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, with response time as the dependent variable. However, this approach is fraught with problems. First, because observation windows are finite, no response might be observed during the study period-a situation known as right censoring. If this is the case, how are nonresponders coded? Deleting them would bias the response time downward. Coding them as the number of days observed without a response would also bias the estimates downward, as they are coded as responding when they did not. Further, in an OLS regression of response time, there is no viable way to specify the model's disturbance term; that is, one cannot be assured that the error term will be unbiased (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004; Tuma & Hannan, 1984) .
Event history analysis resolves these problems by modeling not the response time, but the hazard rate: the likelihood that a response will be observed at time t, given that no response occurred prior to time t. Because they model a conditional likelihood, event history methods are not biased by right censoring. In our methodology, each action taken by one firm against another established an opportunity to respond in every host country in which both rival firms competed. However, as we will describe, most often a response occurred in only one of these countries, and data from the rest were right-censored at the time of the response. Therefore, a method that was not biased by this right censoring was critical. Another key advantage of modeling a hazard function was that, given a hazard function, we could directly calculate a response speed (the average number of days until response, for example). A significant increase in the hazard function was directly interpreted as a significant increase in response speed. Also, given a fixed time interval starting with an initiating action, we could also convert the hazard rate directly into the response likelihood for that time interval, as well as interpret the significance of the change in hazard directly as the significance of the change in the likelihood of response (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004; Tuma & Hannan, 1984) .
Given the merits of the event history approach, we used continuous-time event history analysis to model the speed of global automakers' competitive responses in all countries where two rivals (an MNE dyad) competed. Our analyses derived from Cox proportional hazards regression models (Cox, 1972) of the following form:
where h 0 (t) is the baseline hazard function, and X ik (t) is the value of the kth covariate (independent variable) for firm i at time t. A key benefit of the Cox model is that no assumptions are made as to the distribution of the baseline hazard function. For examples of management research using the Cox approach, see Katila and Shane (2006) and Spell and Blum (2005) .
In our data set, the unit of analysis was firmcompetitor-country (firm dyad-country), and the failure event (in event history terminology) was the occurrence of a competitive response. As described earlier, a firm is at risk of responding to its rival (its dyad partner) when that rival acts against it in one or more countries where both compete. Starting on the date of the first action taken by either dyad partner after January 1, 1995, we noted the number of days that elapsed until either (1) the responding firm responded in any country or countries where both competed or (2) the same initiator took another action against the responding firm in one or more countries where both competed (with no response to the first action).
3 In both cases, we noted the time in days between the two actions. Then, for each initiating action, we created a "set" of observations, one for each country where both dyad partners competed. The response time was the same for each observation, but the outcome was not. We coded observations conforming to case 1 above as "responses" ("failures," because the modeled outcome was observed) for all of the countries where the response took place, and as "censored" (because the modeled outcome was not observed by the end of the waiting period) for all other observations in the set (other countries where both rivals competed). Case 2 was coded as "censored" for all observations in the set. Finally, there could be a third case-the observation period ending before the focal firm responded. In these cases, all observations in the set were right-censored at December 31, 2001, and time was coded as the number of days between the initiating action and that date. Appendix B provides an example that will help to clarify this somewhat complex procedure.
After all observations were coded, we deleted all home country observations, for several reasons. First, our theory is very specific to host countries, and it does not apply to home countries directly. Second, many of our independent variables only make sense in host markets (e.g., home-host country distance, subsidiary control, host government constraints). Finally, firms are likely to exhibit somewhat different competitive behavior in their home countries (Chen, Yu, Michel, & Cannella, 2006) , a circumstance that, although theoretically interesting, is outside the scope of our study. Note that although we do not model home country responses, our sampling design accounts for home country actions. Each and every home country action initiates a set of host country response opportunities. Additionally, responses in a home country terminate all host country response sets by censoring all nonresponding host country observations on the date of response. Therefore, home country actions and responses are accounted for in the sampling design, though not modeled as dependent variables. Finally, in analyses not reported here, we also analyzed within-country response (i.e., response behavior limited to a country of initiation) and reached conclusions that parallel those reported here for the hypotheses that could be tested in a within-country setting. Table 2 , providing means, standard deviations, and correlations for all variables used in our analyses, suggests no critically collinear variables exist in our data (e.g., r Ͼ .8 [Kennedy, 2003] ). Further, using OLS regression with number of days to a response as the dependent variable, we calculated variance inflation factors (VIFs) for all the independent variables in our analyses. All VIFs were within the 1.03-1.30 range. Finally, in analyses not reported here, we entered our key independent variables one at a time in separate models and found the same signs we found in our event history analyses (see Table 3 ) and very similar significance levels. Table 3 presents the results of the event history analyses. Model 1 provides a baseline Cox model with only control variables. Model 2 adds our independent variables. All coefficients reported in Table 3 represent odds ratios. These are interpreted as the proportional change in hazard rate for a one-unit increase in the independent variable. For example, an odds ratio of 2 indicates that a one-unit increase in the independent variable doubles the hazard. Below, we use the evidence from model 2 of Table 3 to test our hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 states that home-host geographic distance decreases response speed. The evidence from model 2 of Table 3 supports this hypothesis. The odds ratio for home-host geographic distance is .91 (p Ͻ .05), indicating that a one-unit increase in home-host geographic distance reduces the hazard rate of response by 8.63 percent (significantly decreasing response speed). In Hypothesis 2, we state a negative relationship between home and initiating country geographic distance and response speed. Results in model 2 support this hypothesis. The odds ratio of .96 (p Ͻ .05) for homeinitiating country distance indicates that a one-unit increase in geographic distance decreases the hazard rate by 3.7 percent. Hypothesis 3 states that the level of host government constraints on foreign-based MNEs is negatively related to response speed in that host country. The evidence in Table 3 supports this hypothesis as well, with an odds ratio for host government constraints of .69 (p Ͻ .01), indicating that a one-unit increase in host government constraints reduces the hazard rate of response in that country by 30.7 percent, also significantly decreasing response speed.
RESULTS
Hypothesis 4, stating a positive relationship between an MNE's home government constraints and its response speed in host countries, is very strongly supported, as shown in model 2 of Table 3 . The odds ratio of 1.60 (p Ͻ .001) for home government constraints indicates that for each one-unit increase in home government constraints, the hazard rate of response (in host countries) increases by nearly 60 percent, thus also indicating a highly significant (p Ͻ .001) increase in response speed in all host countries.
Hypothesis 5 states that as subsidiary control increases, response speed also increases. The evidence in model 2 of Table 3 , however, does not support this prediction. The odds ratio of 1.00 (.997; p Ͻ .05) suggests that for each unit increase in headquarters control, the hazard rate of response actually decreases by 0.3 percent, thereby decreasing response speed. Thus, although the odds ratio for subsidiary control is significant, its sign is opposite that hypothesized.
Hypothesis 6 states that as the importance of an initiating country increases, the hazard rate of response increases in all host countries. The evidence from model 2 of Table 3 does not support this hypothesis. The odds ratio of 1.00 (.997, n.s.) indicates no association, for our sample, between the strategic importance of an initiating country and response speed. We conducted two additional analyses before drawing conclusions about Hypothesis 6. First, we ran models with only control variables and the strategic importance of an initiating country-no other independent variables-and achieved the same insignificant result (nonsignificance). Second, we included home country responses in several additional models, since the home country is likely to be very strategically important. However, the effects of strategic importance were still insignificant. Therefore, Hypothesis 6 is not supported.
Hypothesis 7, stating that response speed is fast- The hazard rate of response is the dependent variable. Reported values are odds ratios-the hazard rate of a one-unit increase in an independent variable divided by the hazard rate of a baseline level of the independent variable. Odds ratios are interpreted as the proportional change in hazard rate from a one-unit increase in the independent variable; values of 1 indicate no change. Values lower than 1 indicate that increases in the independent variable decrease the hazard rate (decrease response speed), and those greater than 1 indicate that increases in the independent variable increase the hazard rate (increase response speed).
b Logarithm of units sold.
est in an initiating country, is very strongly supported. The odds ratio of 11.87 (p Ͻ .001) in model 2 indicates that when a host country is the country of initiation, the hazard rate is over 11 times greater than it is in host countries where the initiating action did not occur. This is very strong evidence that within-country responses are very important. Finally, Hypothesis 8 states that the degree of multimarket contact an MNE has with a given rival is positively related to its response speed. The odds ratio for multimarket contact in model 2 of Table 3 (10.73, p Ͻ .001) indicates that for each unit increase in multimarket contact, the hazard of response increases about ten times. 4 With respect to the effects of our control variables, we can see (again, in model 2, Table 3 ) that, all else being equal, response speeds are slower in host countries with higher GDP growth (h.r. ϭ 0.97, p Ͻ .05), faster in an initiator's home market (h.r. ϭ 4.20, p Ͻ .001), faster for larger responding firms (h.r. ϭ 1.56, p Ͻ .001), and slower for firms with more international experience (h.r. ϭ 0.99, p Ͻ .001). Additionally, responses are slowed when an initiating action involves more countries (h.r. ϭ 0.96, p Ͻ .001), when the initiating move is more complex (h.r. ϭ 0.80, p Ͻ .05), and when the two rivals are more geographically distant from each other (h.r. ϭ 0.98, p Ͻ .05). Aside from the evidence about international experience, which was expected to be positive but turned out to be negative, all of the evidence from our control variables is aligned with prior evidence and theory in competitive dynamics research.
DISCUSSION
Anchored in competitive dynamics research, our study examined the response speed of MNEs using a set of resource-related and market-related factors derived from previous MNE research. Focusing on the interactive and dynamic nature of global competition, our study addresses how the complexity and diversity of host country markets impact rivalry among MNEs with factors that have no clear parallels in domestic settings. Through investigating a wide range of MNE competitive actions, our approach adds to traditional research in the international business literature, in which scholars have devoted attention largely to topics such as market entry (Delios & Henisz, 2000; Kim & Hwang, 1992; Kogut & Singh, 1988) and foreign direct investment (FDI; Graham, 1990; Knickerbocker, 1973) . Moreover, our study introduces the event history methodology to competitive dynamics research. Our specific sampling design, treating each competitive move as both a response to a previous action by a rival and an initiator of that rival's next response, and treating each action as an initiator of response opportunities over a wide range of markets, paves the way for more sophisticated analyses than ours. Because so much competitive dynamics research predicts response likelihood and/or response time, we believe that the event history methodology is broadly applicable (e.g., Morita, Lee, & Mowday, 1989) and holds great promise for future researchers. Finally, we extended the awareness-motivation-capability framework to a global arena. In doing so, we show that this framework is useful for examining strategic organizational behavior in a variety of contexts.
Implications
The theoretical implications of this research are manifold. First, we found that both the distance between a home country and a host country and the distance between a home country and an initiating country dampen MNEs' response speed. Despite extensive research in the international business literature on the distance between countries, relatively little effort has been made to examine the impact of distance on interfirm rivalry (Chen & Stucker, 1997; Ma, 1998) . Our finding corroborates the argument Ghemawat made when he wrote that, although "much has been made of the death of distance in recent years . . . when it comes to business, that is not only an incorrect assumption, it is a dangerous one " (2001: 138) . The operational complexity geographic distance causes places a premium on responsiveness and agility, making it hard for cross-border competitors to react swiftly to rivals' attacks in host countries. Ghemawat (2001) suggested that, to comprehensively measure the distance between countries, researchers need to focus on four basic dimensions: the cultural, administrative, geographic, and economic. We were able to analyze and develop clear predictions for only one of these, and we cannot say specifically how the other three might influence response speed. As Ghemawat noted, different forms of distance have different influences. Thus, more work is needed to unpack different types of distance and their impacts.
Beyond cultural distance, in the international business literature the significance of government regulations in global business settings has long been recognized. Yet despite extensive study of the effects of government regulations on MNEs' entry modes, location choices, and internationalization processes (e.g., Delios & Beamish, 1999; GomesCasseres, 1990; Loree & Guisinger, 1995; Rugman & Verbeke, 1998) , most current research is silent on how government constraints affect the day-to-day competitive behavior of MNEs. By showing the significant impact of government constraints on the response speed of MNEs in host countries, our study begins to fill this gap. Further, we point toward the potential for nonmarket strategies in global competition (Baron, 1995) . Boddewyn and Brewer (1994) contended that Porter's (1980) paradigm of three generic strategies is incomplete. When firms compete globally, they may find that nonmarket forces control many opportunities. Accordingly, firms should strive to make the best use of government policy-Boddewyn and Brewer's "fourth generic strategy"-to assist them in competing more effectively. Our study bolsters the idea that government policy can be a source of strength for MNEs operating in global contexts, and we encourage future researchers to integrate nonmarket strategies into their analyses of competition.
With respect to subsidiary control, in the international business literature there has long been a debate over its impact on subsidiary activity. Some scholars argue that a high level of subsidiary control restricts the flexibility and autonomy of subsidiaries and impedes their responsiveness to local market environments (Baliga & Jaeger, 1984; Gates & Egelhoff, 1986) . On the other hand, theoretical arguments and empirical evidence show that efficient subsidiary control facilitates global integration and intersubsidiary coordination across different country markets (Ghoshal, 1987; Golden & Ma, 2003; Prahalad & Doz, 1987; Yip, 1995) . In our study, emphasizing the important role headquarters can play in providing subsidiaries with critical resources and information, we propose a positive relationship between subsidiary control and response speed. The results did not support our prediction. One possible explanation could be that there was not enough variance in our subsidiary ownership data. Most of the countries included in our study were developed countries where government restrictions on foreign ownership were relatively weak. Further, our sampled automakers seemed to favor majority ownership, as 82 percent of their subsidiaries were majority-owned, versus 18 percent that were minority owned. With this low variation in ownership structure, ours should not be interpreted as a definitive test of the subsidiary control hypothesis. Additionally, some important factors (and possibly limitations) arise from our research setting. Auto manufacture is very capital-intensive, and subsidiaries endure relatively constrained discretion. For example, most countrylevel subsidiaries cannot design and manufacture cars on their own but must work with MNE headquarters to do so. In contrast, subsidiaries in industries like fast food can be much more creative and independent in action. For instance, KFC's Japanese subsidiary was very creative and experimental, trying menu items and store designs that had no ready parallels in U.S. operations (Bartlett & Rangan, 1992) . Future studies of subsidiary control should address the level of discretion afforded a subsidiary by the nature of its industry.
Regarding the role of market-related factors, our finding of initiating country importance is intriguing. Although we predicted that the strategic importance of an initiating country would have a positive effect on response speed, the coefficient we reported was insignificant. As we noted, that result was not due to multicollinearity, because we ran models including only control variables and strategic importance and achieved the same results. This insignificant finding has several possible explanations. First, all of our companies competed in many countries. Our dyad country counts ranged from 12 to 24. When competitors meet in so many markets, their behavior might diverge somewhat from what mainstream theory would predict. Perhaps it is more important to simply respond to each action, so the centrality of the market where an action was taken is less important. Second, it is possible that the magnitude of response was greater following attacks in strategically important markets, though our event history methodology does not readily lend itself to a study of response strength. However, stronger (more forceful) responses would be consistent with prior research and theory (Chen & MacMillan, 1992; Tsai et al., 1991) . Third, as we pointed out earlier, the auto industry is very capital-intensive, and planning and implementing a response can take time. This fact could render the strategic importance of an initiating country less important than it would be in other settings. Future research is needed to fully explain the implications of initiating country strategic importance for competitive response.
We found strong support for our predictions about within-country response. As expected, MNEs tend to respond quickly in the locations where they are attacked. This finding reinforces the notion of competitive signaling (Clark & Montgomery, 1998; Simmel, 1950) . A forceful response in a country of attack sends a strong signal to rivals, helping to keep them from future attacks. Additionally, much competitive dynamics research suggests that at-tackers gain the upper hand when no response is forthcoming (Chen & MacMillan, 1992; Ferrier et al., 1999) . This idea suggests a strong motive for MNEs to respond in a country of attack, even though they have the capability to respond in other markets.
Finally, our findings about multimarket contact add to the theory of multimarket competition. In the strategic management and industrial organization economics literatures, a number of studies have examined the relationship between multimarket contact and the intensity of rivalry (Evans & Kessides, 1994; Gimeno, 1999) . Relatively little effort, however, has been devoted to studying the actual moves and countermoves of multimarket rivals. Chen (1996) proposed that although a firm with greater multimarket contact is less likely to initiate an attack, it is more likely to move quickly to counter a multimarket rival's move (i.e., to respond when attacked). Our study is one of very few that have delved into this issue (for an exception, see Young et al. [2000] ).
In addition to theoretical implications, important implications for multinational managers also emerge from our study. It reinforces the notion of competitor analysis whereby a manager must know, understand, and predict the competitive actions of rivals (Porter, 1980) . In today's business context, more and more firms do business internationally. Given the increasing price that these firms have to "pay to play" in diverse markets, the theoretical framework and empirical findings of our study can help multinational managers develop a sound understanding of their own and their rivals' resources and capabilities and increase their readiness to engage in competitive activities.
Limitations
Despite its contributions, our study has several limitations. First, our findings are based on firms in a single industry over a specific seven-year period. For this reason, the results may reflect some factors specific to the industry or period under study. Future replication of our research in other settings will help to address this concern. Second, our study only involved competitive actions that could be identified via structured content analysis. We deemed Automotive News a reliable source for studying competitive actions of global automakers. Nevertheless, and despite the extensive checks we made, Automotive News may have missed or underrepresented some competitive actions. Third, because data availability and the scope of our study were both limited, we were not able to fully address several issues. For instance, some have argued that strong home government protection reduces domestic firms' motivation to expand and compete abroad (Marcus, 1990; Rugman & Verbeke, 1990 ). Although we do not think this is a serious concern in the highly globalized auto industry, it may be of concern in other industry settings and thereby warrants consideration in future research. Fourth, our study considered rival dyads (pairs of competitors) to be the appropriate level of analysis. Other researchers have argued strongly that the dyad is the appropriate level of analysis (e.g., Baum & Korn, 1996; Chen, 1996) , but global markets naturally consist of multiple rivals, and our choice to model dyads is therefore a limiting one. For example, there may be constellations of competitors that attack and respond at the alliance level, rather than the firm level (e.g., Das & Teng, 2002) . Or a single firm may aim some attacks or focus some responses toward several competitors simultaneously. Indeed, we strongly encourage future investigators of global rivalry to explicitly consider competitive constellations as well as other ways that single attacks could be simultaneously directed toward multiple rivals. Finally, our study only examined the main effects of some resource-related and market-related variables. However, we do suspect some interaction effects may exist between these variables. All of these limitations leave potentially fruitful avenues for future research.
To conclude, our study, building on competitive dynamics research, examined factors predicting the speed of MNEs' competitive responses in host countries. In presenting our framework as a first step in this new direction, we hope to improve understanding of firm competitive behaviors in the global context. 
APPENDIX A Frequency Counts of Actions
APPENDIX B Data Structure Example
For this example, we assume two companies (Ford and Toyota) and six countries (France, Germany, South Korea, Canada, the United States, and Japan). Table B1 lists the initiators, responders, and countries involved in each of four actions taken by these rivals against each other over a 100-day interval.
a Table B2 lists the event history observations generated by the actions and responses of the dyad over the 100-day window. Each initiating action generates five opportunities for a response-one for each host country in which the dyad competes. Note that Japan is the home country for Toyota and the United States is the home country for Ford.
Although we do not model responses in home countries, actions taken in the home country are included as initiating actions.
The first action, taken by Ford against Toyota, starts the sequence on the 5th day of the observation period. Ford is the initiator, and Toyota the target. The initiating action was taken in France and Japan. This sets up the first five observations, with Toyota as the responder, Ford as the initiator, and with Toyota able to respond in every country except its home country (Japan). Figure B1 (next page) illustrates this sequence. On day 35 (30 days after the attack) Toyota responded against Ford in Germany and Canada. Therefore, in the first set of observations, those for Germany and Canada are coded as responses (a response was observed) and those for South Korea, France, and the United States are coded as censored (no response was observed by the end of the observation period).
Toyota's response now becomes the initiating action for the second set of response opportunities. Here, Ford is the target, and can respond in any of its five host countries. At day 70 (35 days later) Ford responds againstToyota in Canada, France, and Japan. Therefore, the observations for Canada, France, and Japan are coded as responses, and those for Germany and South Korea are coded as censored.
Ford's response becomes the initiating attack for the third set of response opportunities (with Toyota as the responder). Observations are created for each of Toyota's five host countries. At day 85 (15 days later), Ford attacks Toyota again. Therefore, each of Toyota's five observations are censored at 15 days-no response was observed by the target firm in any country, and the initiator attacked again.
Finally, Ford's attack on day 85 sets up the final set of five response opportunities for Toyota. Each of these is censored at 15 days, because the observation period ended at that point, and no response was observed from Toyota. We would have used a real example, but all were far more complex than this one because so many countries were involved (a minimum of 12), and so many actions were taken by dyad partners against each other.
b Note that we use "target" instead of "responder" here, because we are describing actions. The target is clear for each action; however, because not every action led to a response, we concluded that "responder" would have been less clear in this setting.
FIGURE B1
Exemplary Action-Response Sequence a "R" indicates "responder," the company whose response is awaited in an interaction. The two columns of circles represent all the countries that both the initiator and the responder compete in. Black circles (always in the left-hand column of circles) indicate the countries in which the initiator attacked the target (responder). The right-hand column of circles has three colors of circles: white means that no response occurred in that country; light gray means that a response did take place in that country; dark gray means that the country was the responder's home country, and so that responder-country combination was deleted from the analysis (as discussed earlier, no home country responses were modeled).
